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In strategic literature, the problems involved with the observation of the way 
organisations and their environment constitute each other has been neglected for far 
too long. The inherent circularity between organisations and their environment in 
defining strategies is often obscured by making either the environment or the 
capabilities of organisations the point reference in defining successful strategies. In this 
paper, it will be illustrated that with a focus on self-reference it is possible to observe, 
both theoretically and methodologically, the way organisations and their environment 
constitute each other reciprocally. For this, we will develop a both/and-approach to 
strategy to illustrate that organisations need to make sense of both their environment 
and organisation. 
Introduction 
This is certainly not the first study that questions the reasoning behind the strategic 
management approaches or schools of thought that have drawn significant attention in 
the past. Several authors have criticised strategic management approaches for being 
overly rational (e.g. Daft & Weick, 1984; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Weick, 1987; 
Pettigrew, 1988; Knights & Morgan, 1991; Whittington, 1993; Rajagopalan & 
Spreitzer, 1996; Barry & Elmes, 1997; Calori, 1998). Until now, however, the reasoning 
behind strategic management approaches has not been applied self-referentially. True, 
some authors have questioned the assumptions behind dominant strategic management 
approaches (e.g. Child, 1972; Weick, 1987; Knights, 1992; Stacey, 2000) but it was not 
explicitly sought out if the reasoning behind these approaches was self-defeating. The 
inherent circularity between oneself and one’s environment in defining strategies is 
often obscured by making either the environment or the capabilities of organisations the  
point reference in defining successful strategies. By means of the outside-in approach of 
Porter (1985) and the inside-out approach of Prahalad & Hamel (1990), it will be 
illustrated that either/or-approaches to strategy are self-defeating. As a result, these 
approaches only seemingly offer certain points of departure in formulating successful 
strategies. 
Porter (1985), for instance, states that sustaining competitive advantage involves 
dealing with competitive forces within a sector of industry to become distinct from your 
competitors. The competitive forces determine the rules of the game in doing business 
within a sector of industry. According to Porter, organisations act wisely if they obey 
these strategic rules. This implies that within Porter’s strategic reality it is not wise if 
organisations try to change the strategic rules, for that leads to a stuck-in-the-middle 
position within the sector of industry. The only two ways of becoming distinct are by 
adopting a ‘cost leadership’ strategy or a ‘strategy of differentiation’. Because Porter 
beliefs the strategic rules within a sector of industry are objective, all competitors will 
observe the same strategic rules and choose a strategy to become distinct accordingly. 
Paradoxically, this will result in the situation that strategy no longer concerns doing 
things differently, but by doing things the same as your competitors do. After all, if 
either all organisations adopt a strategy of ‘cost leadership’ or ‘differentiation’, 
ironically, the only way to become distinct from your competitors is to enact a ‘stuck-
in-the-middle’ strategy that, according to Porter, should be avoided at all expense. 
In addition, the most popular strategic management movement of the ninety-nineties is 
not preserved of self-defeating reasoning. In recent years, one of the most used 
‘buzzwords’ in strategic management was the notion of ‘core competence’. According 
to Prahalad & Hamel (1990), the founding fathers of this concept and who disputed the 
competitive advantage concept of Porter, the existence of core competences of 
organisations is independent of the markets served by these organisations. This means 
that a core competence can be applied in diverse independent markets. However, in 
their book ‘Competing for the Future’ (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994) they state that the 
capabilities of organisations that need to be regarded as core competences eventually 
needs to be determined by customers. That is, market success determines the core 
competences of organisations. It appears, paradoxically, that core competences should 
be regarded as both dependent and independent of the markets served at the same time. 
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This leads to the situation that the ‘inside-out’ approach to strategy as recommended by 
Prahalad & Hamel, ironically, needs to be accompanied by the ‘outside-in’ approach of 
Porter, which they so fiercely attack, in order to determine an organisation’s core 
competences. 
The fact that paradoxes can be brought to light within these dominant strategic 
management approaches should not be interpreted as a shortcoming of these approaches 
per se. As will be illustrated later on in this paper, paradoxes appear to be omnipresent. 
Strategic management approaches can only be criticised for the denial of their 
paradoxical foundation. Denying this paradoxical foundation leads to either/or-
approaches to strategy that fail to grasp the specifics of the ways members of 
organisations deal with strategy. In order to come up with a both/and-approach to 
strategy that does justice to its tautological and paradoxical origin and grasps the 
specifics of dealing with strategy more accurately, it seems helpful to find an 
explanation for the fact that either/or-approaches fail to acknowledge the tautological 
and paradoxical origin of strategy. 
The Blind Spot of the Paradigm of Adaptation 
To look for an explanation for the impossibility of either/or-approaches to acknowledge 
their tautological and paradoxical origin is in fact the ‘second-order’ observation of its 
logic. This implies that we need to observe how the relationship between organisations 
and their environment is conceptualised. To put it differently, we need to locate the 
‘blind spot’ of an either/or-approach to strategy with respect to its founding distinction 
between organisations and their environment. A blind spot relates to the point that 
cannot be observed because of the way observation takes place. This point can be traced 
when we take into consideration the statement of Igor Ansoff, the founding father of 
modern strategic thinking, about the phenomenon that according to him binds all 
strategic schools of thought: ‘It concerns the logic which guides the process by which 
an organisation adapts to its external environment’ (Ansoff, 1987: 501). 
All strategic schools of thought (Mintzberg, 1990) take the problem of adaptation as 
their starting point. That is because all schools of thought relate strategic management 
to the problem of defining strategies to deal with an environment that is ever changing. 
Consequently, it seems that the problem of adaptation functions as a paradigm for 
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strategic researchers. The paradigm of adaptation is based upon the assertion that 
organisations constitute their environment in the same way as parts together form a 
whole. This whole is thought to be relevant for all the organisations constituting it and 
as such determines which strategies need to be regarded as successful and which 
strategies need to be regarded as unsuccessful. The problem of organisations therefore is 
how to adapt to the environment such that successful strategies result. However 
reasonable this reasoning may seem at first glance, it is the very reason either/or 
approaches to strategy exist. 
Within the paradigm of adaptation, organisations are observed as parts of the more 
encompassing environment. This implies that organisations trying to observe their 
environment need to conceptualise their environment as something existing despite of 
their own existence. However, this cannot be true because the environment is nothing 
else as the sum of it parts and therefore the environment exists only because of the parts 
constituting it. This finding is the direct opposite of what was presumed. The paradox 
thus is that the environment exists despite and because of the organisations constituting 
it at the same time. The only way to evade this paradox within the paradigm of 
adaptation is by giving primacy to either environmental or organisational issues and in 
the process denying the relevance of its counterpart to explain successful strategic 
conduct. Consequently, the blind spot of both these either/or-approaches relates to the 
impossibility to conceptualise that organisations and their environment constitute each 
other reciprocally and that both are equally valid starting points to define strategies. 
By maintaining the conception as if organisations make part of a more encompassing 
environment, it remains problematic how to conceptualise the way organisations and 
their environment constitute each other reciprocally. The conception that social systems 
make part of a more encompassing environment eventually leads to the tautology that 
social systems are possible because they make themselves possible (Luhmann, 1975: 
195). This tautology contradicts with the paradigm of adaptation because within this 
paradigm the environment mediates between successful and unsuccessful social 
conduct. The paradigm of adaptation thus is self-defeating, which leads us to 
questioning the applicability of Ashby’s famous ‘Law of Requisite Variety’. 
This law states that in order to be in control a system needs as least as many control-
measures as there is external variety (Ashby, 1956: 206-207). If social systems succeed 
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in establishing a point-to-point accordance with their environment, we would not be 
able to discern between what is system and what is environment anymore (Luhmann, 
1984: 48). The environment of social systems is much too complex to comprehend and 
therefore the environment needs to be observed by social systems as reduced complex-
ity (Luhmann, 1984: 47). This implies that adapting to one’s environment is something 
that is impossible because it leads to the question to what you are actually adapting. It 
cannot be the environment ‘an sich’ because of its incomprehensibility and it cannot be 
a reduction of the environment ‘für mich’ because then you would need to adapt to 
yourself. These considerations lead to oscillation in the sense that adaptation to your 
environment seems only possible by adapting to yourself and that, at the same time, 
self-adaptation seems impossible because there is an environment outside of yourself to 
which you need to adapt. The underlying paradox is that for social systems approving to 
the paradigm of adaptation is only possible by disapproving it. This paradox proves it 
impossible for organisations to gain ‘Requisite Variety’ for it leads to oscillating 
indecision. In order to prevent this indecision from occurring, the system/environment-
distinction needs to be conceptualised differently. The theory of social systems enables 
such a conceptualisation, as will be illustrated next.  
The Role of Self-Reference in Strategic Sensemaking 
Embracing the notion that social systems can be observed as self-referential systems 
sheds new light on the relationship between social systems and their environment 
(Luhmann, 1984). That is because within the theory of social systems, each system has 
its own environment. This is a different conception of the system/environment-
distinction because within open systems theory, on which the paradigm of adaptation is 
based, systems and their environment are inclusive, while within social systems theory 
they are exclusive (Figure 1). 







Self-Referential Systems Theory  
Figure 1: The System/Environment-Distinction in various Disguises 
The implication of this new conception of the system/environment-distinction is that 
systems no longer are part of their environment. Self-referential systems have their own 
environment and the unity of the distinction between system and environment is 
regarded as ‘Welt’. The unity of the system/environment-distinction can be seen as the 
point that cannot be observed from within, at least not under penalty of paradox, as will 
be illustrated later. For self-referential systems, ‘Welt’ relates to the ultimate form of 
complexity they need to deal with in becoming existent. It is important to note that 
within the theory of social systems, ‘Welt’ does not refer to an all-embracing 
ontological concept of social reality: ‘Welt’ is never a ‘Welt’ ‘an sich’ but always a 
‘Welt’ ‘für mich’. 
Self-referential systems are autonomous with respect to their environment, which means 
that the environment cannot influence a self-referential system causally, unless the 
system willingly co-operates. This does, however, not mean that self-referential systems 
social systems do not have to deal with their environment. Self-referential systems are 
autonomous with respect to their environment (Luhmann, 1984: 478) but at the same 
time they are forced to deal with their environment (Luhmann, 2000a: 15). Adaptation 
towards the environment is only possible by means of self-adaptation. For social 
systems theory, the paradigm of adaptation, as used within open systems theory, should 
therefore be substituted by a paradigm of self-adaptation. The paradigm of self-
adaptation contains the paradigm of adaptation. After all, when a self-referential system 
naively decides to regard its environment as existing independent of itself, this system 
can adapt to this environment. This implies that the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ is only  
wrong from the perspective of an observer of social systems and not necessarily wrong 
from the perspective of social systems adhering to this law. It is only a contingent, i.e. a 
neither necessary nor impossible solution to reduce complexity. 
SELF-REFERENCE AND TAUTOLOGY 
The fact that self-referential systems experience their environment exclusive to them-
selves implies that they can give primacy to neither their environment nor themselves to 
become existent. Instead, they need to make sense self-referentially of both their 
environment and themselves. As a result, sensemaking involves unfolding or 
‘asymmetrising’ the perfect circularity between oneself and one’s environment. The 
existence of social systems is therefore grounded upon a tautology (e.g. Luhmann, 







Making Sense of One’s 
Existence Self-Referentially
 
Figure 2: The System/Environment-Tautology 
[…] 
(1)  The social system is what the environment is not 
(2)  The environment is what the social system is not 
[…] 
Strategic sensemaking can be defined as seeking solutions to solve this chicken-and-egg 
problem in making sense of the reciprocal relationship between one’s environment and 
organisation. In making sense of this chicken-and-egg problem, organisations stumble 
upon self-reference. That is, while being busy with self-observation, they need to 
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conclude that the problem they face only exists because they created it themselves. This 
problem is similar to the problem of the Baron of Münchhausen who needed to pull 
himself out of the swamp by his own hair. In order to deal with this tautology, self-
referential systems cannot relate to reason anymore and, by means of communication, 
can only give meaning tautologically (a) to itself in the sense that it could be what it 
could be or (b) to the environment in the sense that it, again, could be what it could be 
(Figure 2). Confronted with either of these tautologies, they may experience an excess 
of opportunities to choose from in making the system existent, which may lead to an 
inability to choose. Therefore, the only way to become existent is by naively doing 
something: ‘just do it!’ (Spencer Brown, 1972). Dealing with self-reference thus 
involves acting naively and as a result, each choice made by these systems to become 
existent, is contingent because they could have chosen otherwise in throwing 
themselves into the world. This world, however, is imperfect because it is impossible to 










Figure 3: Re-Entry of the System/Environment-Distinction 
SELF-REFERENCE AND PARADOX 
Once they are operational, self-referential systems may reflect upon their operations and 
their identity. When they do this, the system/environment-distinction reappears into 
itself. This ‘re-entry’ (Spencer-Brown, 1972; Luhmann, 1994) of the distinction 
between system and within the same distinction can appear at both sides of the 
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distinction (Figure 3). When the distinction reappears into the system part of the 
system/environment-distinction, self-referential systems reflect upon their existence 
from an ‘agency’-perspective: ‘what could we be according to ourselves?’. In the other 
case, ‘structure’-perspective is used: ‘what should we be according to our environ-
ment?’. In both cases, however, the self-observation is paradoxical because self-
referential systems try to observe their ‘Welt’ despite of themselves, whereas it only 
exists because of them. All this leads to the situation that a self-referential system that 
observes itself does actually not observe itself, which is caused by the fact that during 
the self-observation, a self-referential system cannot observe that it is involved with the 
observation of itself. The fact that each observation has its blind spot leads to the 
situation that observation is a paradoxical operation, i.e. only when you close your eyes 
to something, you are able to see. This blind spot causes that self-referential systems are 
unfathomable for themselves, which leads to the paradox that they cannot identify 
themselves while being busy with identifying themselves. Ironically, in failing to observe 
their identity, they stumble upon a problem that they have already solved, that is their 
existence. 
THE EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION OF SELF-REFERENCE 
The function of tautology and paradox is to indicate that social systems need to do 
something to escape self-referential closure. For this reason, the point of carrying out 
empirical research to investigate the role of self-reference within strategic sensemaking 
is to determine the extent to which social systems jeopardise their self-reproduction due 
to the blind spots involved with their contingent existence. This empirical research 
should be done by means of the ‘functional method’ (Luhmann, 1964 & 1974), which 
accompanies the theory of social systems (Luhmann, 1984). The aim of the functional 
method is to compare solutions or functional equivalents to the problems involved with 
self-reference on their dysfunctionalities, i.e. how do solutions both enable and 
constrain communication. The problem/solution scheme of observation can be used 
recursively, i.e. problems can also be viewed as solutions and solutions as problems 
(Luhmann, 1974: 20). In the first case, the focus is upon dysfunctional effects or 
unintended consequences of a solution chosen in the past. Alternatively, in the second 
case, the focus is upon dysfunctional effects or unintended consequences of a solution 
presently in use. In determining dysfunctional effects of functional equivalents, the 
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focus is upon theories that are able to explain the usual as being unusual (Luhmann, 
1984: 162). The benefits of this methodological stance are that reality does not have to 
be explained tautologically in terms of what it is, but can also be approached 
paradoxically in terms of what it is not (Luhmann, 1987). 
For an empirical focus on self-reference, two distinct ways of observation can be used: 
first and second-order observation (Von Foerster, 1981). Research aimed at first-order 
observations takes as it point of reference the things that can be observed by social 
systems and research aimed at second-order observations takes as it point of reference 
the things that cannot be observed by social systems. It is apparent that for second-order 
observation the researcher needs an observational-framework that is more comprehen-
sive or complex than the framework in use by the observed social system. In both cases, 
however, the research is focused on the various ways or functional equivalents with 
which social systems ‘de-tautologise’ and ‘de-paradoxalise’ themselves. The ultimate 
goal of functional analysis is to compare these functional equivalents in order to rule out 
risky and dysfunctional ones (Luhmann, 1984: 47). From a methodological stance the 
implications of these considerations are that it should matter for social researchers what 
should be included and excluded from the research. That is, what is meaningful is first 
and foremost decided upon by the social systems under investigation (Luhmann, 1997: 
37-38). 
THREE TYPES OF SELF-REFERENCE 
Within social systems theory, three types of self-reference are being distinguished that 
are linked to three levels of systemic aggregation (Luhmann, 1984: 600-602). On the 
level of operations, self-reference relates to basic or operational self-reference, which 
involves the recursive relation between communications as such. This recursion relates 
to the self-reproduction or autopoiesis of communications based upon communications. 
Through the autopoiesis of communications, social systems become real. For this 
reason, the realm or medium of operations is called ‘Realität’ or reality. ‘Realität’ is the 
unity of the distinction between knowledge and objects (symbolic generalisations). 
The second type of self-reference is called reflexivity and is accounted for on the level 
of processes. Reflexivity involves observing the structures of meaning that make the 
temporal communications on the operational level expectable. Structures can be seen as 
contingent reductions of the available options to bridge the gap between two subsequent 
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operations (Luhmann, 1984: 73-74; 383-384). Through the structures of meaning, social 
systems decide upon what is meaningful and what is not for the autopoiesis of their 
communications. For this reason, the medium of processes is called ‘Sinn’ or meaning. 
‘Sinn’ is the unity of the distinction between what is current and what is possible. 
On the systemic level, lastly, self-reference is referred to as reflection. Reflection 
involves sensemaking with respect to the operational unity of social systems based upon 
the system/environment-distinction. This self-observation relates to the re-entry of the 
system/environment-distinction into the same distinction. As such, reflection brings to 
light again the tautological and paradoxical foundation of social systems. Through the 
various identities that can be identified, social systems decide upon what matters or not 
with respect to the world they live in. For this reason, the medium of systemic 
observation is called ‘Welt’ or world, which is the unity of the distinction between 
system and environment. 
‘Realität’, ‘Sinn’ and ‘Welt’ can be regarded as Luhmann’s ‘Holy Trinity’ because they 
function the same as the concept of God, i.e. the absorption of paradoxes inherent to the 
use of distinctions within society (e.g. Nassehi, 1992: 64). The term ‘Welt’ for example 
is unitary because the negation of the world can only be performed within the world 
(Luhmann, 1988: 42). The fact that social systems theory acknowledges this paradoxical 
foundation must be observed as a major breakthrough in social theorising. After all, by 
this manoeuvre the theory becomes self-referential and truly universal: it is able to 
appear within itself as a functional equivalent to theorise about social life. The main aim 
of social systems theory therefore is to deconstruct itself (Baecker, 2001: 69) to observe 
the ignorance sustained by its paradoxical foundations. 
The Outline of a Both/And-Approach to Strategy 
The main lesson that can be learned from the previous section is that the existence of 
organisations is grounded upon tautology and paradox. For self-referential systems, 
tautology and paradox are omnipresent. Therefore, it becomes clear that social systems 
thrive primarily on meaning instead of reason in dealing with their self-referential 
closure. The social world they live in is imperfect, which forces organisational members 
to deal deliberately with environmental and organisational complexity in order to keep 
their organisation existent. Due to this complexity, organisations need to address their 
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ability to deal with contradiction on the level of operations, processes and systems. The 
three types of self-reference and levels of aggregation mentioned in the previous section 
are not linked by Luhmann to the levels of first and second-order observation, at least 
not explicitly. Nonetheless, relating the levels of aggregation and observation to each 
other leads to useful indications for the kind of knowledge that the functional analysis 
of strategic sensemaking could contribute to strategy research (Figure 4). 
•  On the level of operations, organisational members can be forced strategically to 
alter the way they have asymmetrised their organisation’s environment and 
organisation. This implies that organisational members need to be able to reflect 
upon the strategic concepts (e.g. added values) in use to make sense of the 
organisation’s strategic operations (e.g. gaining competitive advantage). In 
dealing with their strategy, therefore, members of organisations need to find out 
what is real and unreal with respect to the strategic problems and solutions they 
experience in their ‘Realität’. 
•  On the level of processes, organisational members can be forced strategically to 
alter the way they have structured their expectations regarding the 
organisation’s environment and organisation. This implies that organisational 
members need to be able to reflect upon the strategic routines (e.g. strategic 
sessions) in use to make sense of the strategy process (e.g. developing a 
strategic plan annually). In dealing with their strategy, therefore, members of 
organisations need to find out how their ‘Sinn’ enables and constrains them in 
communicating about what is possible and impossible to achieve strategically. 
•  On the systemic level, organisational members can be forced strategically to alter 
they way they have identified their organisation’s environment and organisation. 
This implies that organisational members need to be able to reflect upon the 
strategic roles (e.g. employer) in use to make sense of the organisation’s 
strategic context (e.g. acquiring new personnel). In dealing with their strategy, 
members of organisations, by means of communication, need to find out what 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observing the way 
strategic concepts are 
used to make sense of the 
strategy content with a 
focus on contradictory 
information 
Observing the strategic 
concepts used as 
contingent in order to 
explain why the strategy 




equivalents in making 
sense of strategic content 
in order to rule out risky 
and dysfunctional ones 
Strategic 
Process 
Observing the way 
strategic routines are 
used to make sense of 
strategic processes with a 
focus on contradictory 
expectations 
Observing the strategic 
routines used as 
contingent in order to 
explain why the strategy 




equivalents in making 
sense of strategic 
processes in order to rule 




Observing the way 
strategic roles are used 
to make sense of the 
strategic context with a 
focus on contradictory 
identities 
Observing the strategic 
roles used as contingent 
in order to explain why 
the strategy context is 




equivalents in making 
sense of strategic context 
in order to rule out risky 
and dysfunctional ones 
Table 1: The Both/And-Approach to Strategy 
The functional method aids in exploring the way organisational members make 
contingently sense of their organisation’s strategic content, process and context 
(Pettigrew, 1987; De Wit & Meyer, 1994). The use of ‘strategic choice’ within Figure 4 
should not be interpreted as if decision making is subjectivist by nature and the sessence 
of managerial work (cf. Simon, 1960). Rather it should be interpreted that strategic 
decisions are symbolically enacted upon (cf. Weick, 1987) by means of communication 
that transcends the level of individual members of organisations (Luhmann, 2000b). 
Within Table 1, the both/and-approach of strategic sensemaking based upon social 
systems theory is presented. 
The notions of strategic content, process and context can be used synonymous with the 
notions of operations, processes and systems as they appear in social systems theory. 
That is because without making sense of strategic content there would be no strategic 
process and no strategic context. The functional analysis of strategic sensemaking 
processes by means of first-order observation is aimed at exploring the way members of 
organisations give meaning self-referentially to their organisation’s strategic content, 
process and context both deliberately and naively to make the organisation existent and 
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to remain it throughout time. In addition, by means of second-order observation, 
functional analysis is aimed at observing how organisations may jeopardise their 
existence because of the way they try to remain existent. In the remainder of this 
section, the both/and-approach to strategy will be described in more detail. 
MAKING SENSE OF STRATEGIC CONTENT BY MEANS OF STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 
Strategic content relates to decisions concerning the use of strategic concepts that aid in 
making sense of the strategy content. It is far from controversial to distinguish between 
strategic content on the one hand and strategic process on the other hand, for instance, 
Weick (1987) indicated that strategy most of the time involves acting first and thinking 
later. Strategic content as it is used here, does not refer to the planning of strategies but 
to the concepts used within the process. This implies that when we focus on the content 
of strategies, we can uncover the use of management concepts or symbolic 
generalisations like ‘core business’, ‘core competence’, ‘added value’, ‘leverage’, etc. 
While the rise and fall of management concepts such as these is a phenomenon worthy 
of further critical exploration (e.g. Johnson, 1990; Collins, 2000; Ortmann & Salzman, 
2002), it cannot be denied that they aid in organisational sensemaking processes (e.g. 
Duimering & Safayeni, 1998). Apparently, it seems not of importance what manage-
ment concepts mean, it is what you can make them mean. Take for example the notion 
of ‘core competence’ (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Throughout their entire book, Prahalad 
& Hamel (1994) remain vague about what core competences actually are. Notwithstan-
ding this, since the launch of the core competence concept, several authors have made 
checklists that enable managers to determine if their organisation has core competences 
(e.g. Stalk, Evans & Shulman, 1992; Bartness & Cerny, 1993). 
In strategic ‘guru’ literature, many strategic management concepts can be found that 
should aid organisations in formulating competitive strategies. While it is easy to 
condemn the validation of strategic concepts, it is less easy to condemn their validity. 
After all, strategic concepts are used by managers, consultants and researchers to 
highlight issues about organisational life that remained underexposed before they used 
them. From the perspective of social systems theory, it could be said that strategic 
concepts function as means to become operational. In other words, strategic concepts 
asymmetrise tautologies like that the markets to be served depend on the products 
offered and the products to be offered depend on the markets served. Because each 
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asymmetry is arbitrary per definition, a strategic concept is neither necessary nor 
impossible to make sense of strategic issues. The latter indicates that strategic concepts 
or asymmetries may actually aid in strategic sensemaking and the former indicates that 
no strategic asymmetry can claim superiority in strategic sensemaking because that 
would contradict with its in-necessity. Therefore, somehow, strategic gurus seem right 
and wrong at the same time. They are right in formulating various ways to become 
competitive and wrong in their one-sided preference for highlighting specific ways to 
become competitive. 
The functional analysis of strategic content is aimed at comparing and evaluating 
functional equivalents in the way organisational members make sense of the content of 
their organisation’s strategies by means of enacting strategic concepts. The theoretical 
relevance of this perspective is to uncover the way members of organisations deal with 
contradictory information regarding strategic concepts in use by the organisation. In 
addition, the inability of members of organisations to cope with contradictory 
information and unintended consequences regarding the used strategic concepts can be 
uncovered. The former relates to the first-order observation and the latter to the second-
order observation of the use of strategic concepts (see Table 1). 
MAKING SENSE OF STRATEGIC PROCESS BY MEANS OF STRATEGIC ROUTINES 
Strategic processes relate to decisions concerning the use of strategic routines that aid in 
making sense of the strategy process. Just like strategic content, the strategic process 
has gained significant attention of strategic researchers in the past. Regarded first as a 
dominantly rational process by the likes of Chandler (1962), Cyert & March (1963), 
Ansoff (1965) and Hofer & Schendel (1978), later the concept of unintended strategies 
emerged (e.g. Quinn, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Weick, 1987, Johnson, 1988) 
and now we have stumbled upon chaotic strategies (e.g. Fitzgerald & Van Eijnatten, 
1998; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998; Stacey, 2000). The cited authors predominantly focus 
upon the decision processes concerning strategy. Others have adopted a post-modern 
perspective and are focused upon power and political issues influencing the strategy 
process (e.g. Knights & Morgan, 1991; Knights, 1992; Barry & Elmes, 1997). The 
notion of strategic process as used here combines both perspectives and aims at 
discovering the structures of meaning that keep the self-reproduction or autopoiesis of 
strategic routines going. This implies that when we focus on the strategic process, we 
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can uncover the strategic routines that structure the communication processes 
concerning the way strategies are formulated, implemented, evaluated, etc. One possible 
subject of research could be to explore the way organisations make sense of their 
strategy process by means of the use of rational strategic decision models like The 
Boston Consulting Group’s ‘Business Portfolio Management’ or Porter’s ‘Value Chain 
Analysis’. In other words, the focus could be on the way such methods aid in creating 
frames of reference in the sense of a ‘dominant logic’ (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986 and 
Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). In general, interesting research subjects would be to explore 
how knowledge, power, money, trust, ethics etc. structure the strategic routines of 
organisations. 
The functional analysis of strategic process is aimed at comparing and evaluating 
functional equivalents in the way organisational members make sense of their 
organisation’s strategic process by means of enacting strategic routines. The theoretical 
relevance of this perspective is to uncover the way members of organisations deal with 
contradictory expectations regarding the strategic routines in use by the organisation. 
In addition, the inability of organisations to cope with contradictory expectations and 
unintended consequences regarding the used strategic routines can be uncovered. 
MAKING SENSE OF STRATEGIC CONTEXT BY MEANS OF STRATEGIC ROLES 
Strategic context relates to decisions concerning the use of strategic roles that aid in 
making sense of the strategic context. In addition to content and process, strategic 
context has drawn significant attention in the past. One specific research area relates to 
‘corporate governance’ or ‘stakeholder theory’. Since the publication of the landmark 
book of Freeman (1984), the idea that organisations have stakeholders has become 
commonplace in both organisation studies (e.g. Alkhafaji, 1989; Brummer, 1991; 
Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995; Frooman, 1999; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999; 
Jones & Wicks, 1999; Scott & Lane, 2000; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Tirole, 2001) 
and management literature (recently e.g. Cummings & Doh (2000) and Waddock & 
Smith (2000)). According to Freeman, the stakeholder approach is about groups and 
individuals who can affect an organisation and, in addition, is about managerial 
behaviour taken in response to those groups and individuals (Freeman, 1984: 48). 
Sensemaking about stakeholders concerns three questions (Frooman, 1999: 191): ‘Who 
are they?’, ‘What do they want?’ and ‘How are they going to try to get it?’. Our notion 
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of strategic context primarily focuses upon the role expectations stakeholders have with 
respect to organisations and how the sum of these role-expectations can be used as a 
measure of corporate identity (see also Gioia & Thomas (1996) and Scott & Lane 
(2000)). This conception of corporate identity highlights that organisations have to 
make sense of several distinct environments dependent on the stakeholders thought to 
be of relevance. Identity thus is a multidimensional construct and does not have to be a 
coherent whole. On the contrary, due to environmental complexity it is to be expected 
that dealing with one’s identity strategically leads to contradictions between several 
dimensions of identity. 
The functional analysis of strategic identity is aimed at comparing and evaluating 
functional equivalents in the way organisational members make sense of their 
organisation’s strategic context by means of enacting strategic roles. The theoretical 
relevance of this perspective is to uncover the way members of organisations deal with 
contradictory identities regarding the strategic roles in use by the organisation. In 
addition, the inability of organisations to cope with contradictory identities and 
unintended consequences regarding the used strategic roles can be uncovered. 
Conclusions 
It can be concluded that existing approaches to strategy fail to acknowledge their 
tautological and paradoxical foundation. The inability of strategy researchers to 
comprehend this can probably best be illustrated by means of a recent discussion with 
respect to the dynamic capabilities view (Teece & Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997). 
Priem & Butler argue that the dynamic capabilities view is undermined by the tautology 
that ‘competitive advantage is defined in terms of value and rarity, and the resource 
characteristics argued to lead to competitive advantage are value and rarity’ (Priem & 
Butler, 2001: 28). Barney (2001: 41-42) and Eisenhardt & Martin (2000: 1116) replied 
to this observation but from their comments it appears that they miss the point that the 
tautological reasoning behind what should be regarded as valuable and scarce resources 
is what makes them valuable and rare is exactly the tautology members of organisations 
experience when they consider their valuable and scarce resources. In other words, they 
fail to see that the tautological ground-figure underlying strategic decision-making is the 
main problem of making sense of strategic issues. As such, social systems theory may 
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aid to a better understanding of strategic sensemaking. Our contribution is a first attempt 
in this respect. 
From sensemaking literature (e.g. Weick, 1995) it may appear as if organisations are 
free to enact their environment as they please. That is, it may appear as if organisations 
are viewed ‘as isolated units confronting a faceless environment’ (see Pfeffer (1987: 
120) for this criticism of mainstream strategy research). This criticism certainly does not 
apply to the strategic sensemaking perspective as presented here. In system theoretical 
terms, this preferred way of observing the environment implies a preference to observe 
the system/environment-distinction as a re-entry within the system-part of the same 
distinction. That is, observing the way organisations observe themselves as being 
autonomous towards their environment. Naturally, as we have shown, the re-entry 
within the environment-part of the system/environment distinction is also possible. As 
such, our strategic sensemaking perspective seems to offer strategy researchers a more 
comprehensive way to observe the reciprocal relation between organisations and their 
environment from both an agency (Child, 1972 & 1997) and structure perspective 
(Donaldson, 1985 & 1997). 
It should be stressed that for the functional analysis of strategic sensemaking, distinct 
research methods can be used, whether these methods are quantitative or qualitative 
(Luhmann, 1997: 37). Functional analyses of social phenomena should adhere to the 
paradox that human agency becomes human bondage because of the very nature of 
human agency (Dawe: 1979), which implies in our case that the focus should be on the 
way organisational members are involved with sensemaking self-referentially by means 
of communication. In studying this, both social systems and researchers need to adhere 
to the ‘laws’ that dealing with self-reference impose on them, as will be illustrated next. 
Because of self-reference and the paradigm of self-adaptation, dealing with the 
contingent nature of social and organisational life can be translated into the ‘Law of 
Requisite Reflexivity’: in order to stay in control an organisation needs to be able to 
deal with its inabilities by means of self-observation. This law states that social systems 
should be able to develop new self-descriptions dependent on the situation at hand. As 
indicated before, this new paradigm of self-adaptation includes the old paradigm of 
adaptation and the related either/or-approaches to strategy. Naturally, the ‘Law of 
Requisite Reflexivity’ applies to social researchers also, which implies that social 
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researchers are forced to question the ignorance sustained that enables and constrains 
the way research is done. 
Lastly, the framework as presented here has little to do with the quest for the ‘holy 
grail’ of strategic success. Despite the critics of leading figures in organisation studies 
(e.g. Goodman, Pennings et al., 1977; March & Sutton, 1997), the preoccupation of 
mainstream strategy research with performance remains unbroken. Perhaps we should 
go ahead with a less ambitious aim: to merely restrict ourselves in describing how 
organisations contingently reduce the complexity involved with making sense of the 
strategy phenomenon (cf. Nicolai, 2000: 301-302). Within a social systems perspective, 
explaining strategy relates to descriptions of the blind spots, un-decidabilities and 
unintended consequences of strategic self-descriptions (cf. Weick, 1999). Because of 
the self-reference involved, it seems the only knowledge we have to offer to both 
practitioners and ourselves takes the form of ‘ironic compassion’ in the quest for the 
‘paradise lost’ that is called strategic success. After all, forty years of strategy research 
has taught us that each strategic success is foreshadowed by its failure. 
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